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INTRODUCTION 
The number of unlawful weapons defendants appearing in federal 
court almost doubled between 2000 and 2005.1 In addition, federal 
judges currently impose harsher sentences on felon in possession 
defendants.2 This is a direct result of an increased involvement by 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Economics, cum 
laude, Colgate University, 2009. The author developed his interest in the law from his 
parents, and would therefore like to dedicate this note to them, John McDonald, Esq. and the 
Honorable Bernadette N. DeCastro, J.S.C. 
1 In 2000, the United States government filed weapons charges against 2810 individuals 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), whereas in 2005 that number had grown to 5513. See infra 
Appendix I “Number of defendants in cases filed.” See also Federal Criminal Case 
Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under 
“U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Number of defendants in cases filed”; then 
select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter 
“44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally, select desired output format) (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2010). 
2 The mean prison term trended upwards between 2000 and 2008. The frequency of 
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federal law enforcement into areas of criminal law that were 
traditionally believed to be reserved for the states. This Note will 
analyze the relationship between the federal sentencing guidelines and 
the felon in possession statute, which forbids a convicted felon from 
possessing a firearm.3 
The felon in possession law provides a particularly unique vehicle 
for federal prosecutions because the required felony may have been 
from a state court. Additionally, federal prosecutions often originate at 
the state level and are referred by local law enforcement for federal 
prosecution to capitalize on the harshness of federal sentencing 
guidelines. Given the nature of these prosecutions, many of which 
would likely have been pursued by local law enforcement, courts should 
be allowed, if not required, to consider the disparity between federal 
defendants and similarly situated state defendants. 
This Note will begin in Section I with a brief discussion of the 
background of the felon in possession law contained in 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), including its purpose for enactment and its elements. Section 
II will provide background information on the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines and examine particular sentencing considerations for felons 
in possession of firearms. Section III will discuss the increasing 
federalization of local crime through the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Section IV will discuss the particular methods employed 
by the United States government in ferreting out gun possession by 
prohibited persons. Finally, Section V will examine the reasons for 
allowing federal courts to consider state sentences despite the 
guidelines’ concern for eliminating federal sentencing disparities. 
 
defendants sentenced to life also increased during this time period, particularly since 2004. 
See infra charts titled “Defendants sentenced to life” and “Mean prison sentence in months.” 
See also Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, supra note 1 (under “U.S. Criminal 
Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Mean prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for 
defendants convicted”; then select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within 
U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally, select 
desired output format). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2005) (“It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE FELON IN POSSESSION LAW 
Writing about his undercover investigation into the Hell’s Angels 
motorcycle gang, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(hereinafter “ATF”) agent Jay Dobyns referred to the felon in 
possession statute as “ATF’s ‘bread-and-butter’ violation.”4 Agent 
Dobyns used this description to tell the other agents of his intention to 
“bust” a recently released man who “was rumored to be in possession of 
a used .38 Rossi.”5 While this is a widely accepted use of the statute,6 it 
does not appear to be a use contemplated by the purported purpose of 
the enactment, which instead suggests the Act targets actual transactions 
in firearms and not solely their possession.7 
The felon in possession statute8 was part of a criminal justice 
system overhaul encapsulated by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, which added “Chapter 44 - FIREARMS.”9 While 
there were early firearm regulations in place,10 this was the first time 
possession of a weapon by a formerly convicted felon constituted a 
crime. The original statute stated: 
[a]ny person who (1) has been convicted by a court of the United 
States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a 
felony, . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce 
or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any 
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not 
more than two years, or both.11 
The statute contained exemptions for licensed law enforcement 
 
4 JAY DOBYNS & NILS JOHNSON-SHELTON, NO ANGEL: MY HARROWING UNDERCOVER 
JOURNEY TO THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE HELLS ANGELS 10 (2010). 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROJECT SAFE 
NEIGHBORHOODS-A NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 
178 (Apr. 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226686.pdf. 
7 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901, 
82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968). Contra § 1201, 82 Stat. at 225 (finding and declaring weapon 
possession by prohibited persons a problem, but limiting incarceration to no longer than two 
years). 
8 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
9 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 902, 82 Stat. at 226. 
10 See, e.g., National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, § 6, 48 Stat. 1236, 1238 (1968) 
(making it unlawful to receive or possess an unregistered or untaxed firearm).  
11 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 1202, 82 Stat. at 236. 
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officers12 and those who have been pardoned by the President.13 The 
reasons Congress provided for the prohibition of certain persons from 
carrying weapons were: (1) to alleviate the burden they placed on 
interstate commerce; (2) to eliminate the threat they posed to the 
President; (3) to eliminate any threat they posed to the first amendment; 
and (4) to eliminate any threat they posed to the government of the 
United States and the government of each state.14 This section, dealing 
with prohibiting possession of firearms by certain individuals, was 
distinct from other sections dealing with illegal trade in firearms, which 
at the time solely composed 18 U.S.C. § 922.15 At its original enactment, 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibited the interstate transportation of stolen 
firearms and ammunition.16 
In Huddleston v. United States,17 the Court noted that Congress 
passed this legislation in order to “curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out 
of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, 
criminal background, or incompetency . . .’” and to channel commerce 
in firearms “through federally licensed importers, manufacturers, and 
dealers in an attempt to halt mail-order and interstate consumer traffic in 
these weapons.”18 This particular case, however, dealt not with the usual 
instance of a felon in possession of a firearm, but instead with a former 
felon who made false statements regarding his prior felony in order to 
recover his former weapon from a pawnshop in violation of another 
prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 922. 
Subsequently, the Gun Control Act of 1968 amended the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.19 The felon in possession 
statute remained codified in Section 1202.20 The only real change with 
respect to felon in possession law was the qualification of the term 
felon, which previously included “any offense punishable by 
 
12 § 1203(1), 82 Stat. at 237. 
13 § 1203(2), 82 Stat. at 237. 
14 § 1201, 82 Stat. at 236. 
15 Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 902, 82 Stat. at 226 
(prohibiting illegal trade in firearms), with § 1202, 82 Stat. at 236 (prohibiting possession of 
firearms by prohibited persons). 
16 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 922(g), 82 Stat. at 231. 
17 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974). 
18 Id. at 824. 
19 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301(a), 82 Stat. 1213, 1237 (1968). 
20 § 301, 82 Stat. at 1236. 
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imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,”21 to exclude “any offense 
(other than one involving a firearm or explosive) classified as a 
misdemeanor under the laws of a State and punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or less.”22 
In 1986, Congress again amended the felon in possession statute 
through the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act.23 Unlike its predecessors, 
this Act purported to represent an amelioration of the perceived 
harshness of federal firearm regulation.24 This amendment made major 
changes to the structure of the felon in possession law. First, it removed 
those who are under indictment for felonies from the purview of the 
statute.25 Second, it eliminated Section 1201, which contained the 
original felon in possession statute.26 Finally, it replaced the prior 
prohibitive language “to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in 
interstate or foreign commerce” with “to ship or transport in interstate 
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm 
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”27 In addition 
to the amendment to the substantive law, Congress also enacted a 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for those convicted under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) who previously had been convicted of three or more 
robberies, burglaries, or a combination of the two.28 Interestingly, the 
two-year statutory maximum protection contained in the predecessor 
felon in possession statute was not carried over to its new codification 
in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).29 In essence, the law prohibiting possession of a 
firearm by a felon moved from its own chapter to one concerned with 
the actual trade, distribution, and movement of illegal weapons.30 
 
21 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 1202(c)(2), 82 Stat. at 236. 
22 Gun Control Act of 1968 § 301(b), 82 Stat. at 1236. 
23 Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 451 (1986). 
24 § 1(b), 100 Stat. at 449. 
25 § 102(6)(A), 100 Stat. at 452. 
26 § 104(b), 100 Stat. at 459. 
27 § 102(6)(D), 100 Stat. at 452. 
28 § 104(a)(4), 100 Stat. at 458. 
29 Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
§ 1202, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968), with Firearms Owner Protection Act § 104(a)(1), 100 Stat. 
at 456 (providing a five year statutory maximum subject to other limitations). 
30 See United States v. Palozie, 166 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The legislative 
history of the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act confirms what the drafting shows: the intent 
of Congress was to combine into one section Titles IV and VII of the Omnibus Crime 
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Today, the government need only prove three elements to convict a 
person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). First, federal prosecutors must 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a court had previously convicted 
the criminal defendant31 of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one 
year.32 Whether or not the defendant actually received a sentence 
exceeding one year is irrelevant for the purposes of this statute.33 The 
only inquiry is whether the prior conviction could have included a term 
of imprisonment exceeding one year, i.e., whether the statutory 
maximum was in excess of one year.34 Even an imposed sentence of 
probation cannot save the defendant from coming under the scope of the 
statute.35 The defendant may not challenge the validity of the conviction 
at the time of trial because “federal gun laws . . . focus not on reliability, 
but on the mere fact of conviction . . . in order to keep firearms away 
from potentially dangerous persons.”36 The challenge must be made 
before the acquisition of a firearm.37 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
previously held that even an expunged matter might serve as the 
predicate conviction.38 However, Congress superseded this type of 
expansion three years later.39 
The second element that the government must prove is that the 
 
Control and Safe Streets Act.”). 
31 The language “any court” refers to any domestic court.  There previously existed a 
split among the circuits as to whether the term “any court” included courts outside the 
territorial control of the United States.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and resolved 
the question in the negative.  See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005). 
32 United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 
(1998). 
33 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 113 (1983) (“It was plainly irrelevant 
to Congress whether the individual in question actually receives a prison term; the statute 
imposes disabilities on one convicted of ‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2005)). 
34 For a greater analysis of this point, see United States v. Currier, 821 F.2d 52, 58-59 
(1st Cir. 1987). 
35 See United States v. Williams, 442 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he fact that 
Defendant’s term of imprisonment was reduced by probation does not convert his violation 
of the statute into a misdemeanor.”). 
36 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980). 
37 Id. 
38 Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121 (“[A] rule that would give effect to expunctions under 
varying state statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV.”). 
39 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2005).  See also United States v. Julian, 974 F. Supp. 809, 
815 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (“Three years after and in response to Dickerson, Congress amended 
Chapter 44 of Title 18.”). 
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defendant possessed the firearm and ammunition alleged in the 
indictment.40 As part of this element, the government must prove that the 
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea of knowingly possessing the 
firearm.41 The government may prove knowledge of possession by 
showing either actual or constructive possession.42 Constructive 
possession is “the power and intention at a given time to exercise 
dominion and control over an object.”43 Either constructive or actual 
possession can be proven by circumstantial evidence.44 
The final element is that the possession affects interstate 
commerce.45  Interpreting this jurisdictional element, courts have used 
an expansive definition of the Commerce Clause based on the Court’s 
instruction in United States v. Lopez46 that eliminates any need to show 
the individual defendant’s possession “substantially” affects interstate 
commerce.47 All that is needed is “a one-time past connection to 
interstate commerce . . . .”48 It appears that the government need only 
prove that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than that in 
which it was found.49 
II. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
This section will introduce the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines and seek to show how they impact sentences for felons in 
 
40 United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 
(1998). 
41 Id. 
42 United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)). 
43 Murphy, 107 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Craven, 478 F.2d at 1333). 
44 Id. 
45 Daniel, 134 F.3d at 1263. 
46 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) 
47 See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, No. 00 Cr. 842, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18192, at 
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2000) (“Accordingly, Lopez’s third prong—requiring that the 
regulated activity ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce—may be satisfied if there is a 
jurisdictional element in place which would ensure that any given act of possession only 
‘affects’ interstate commerce.”). 
48 United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. 
Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The 
evidence in this case was undisputed that defendant’s guns were manufactured in 
Massachusetts and found in California. Consequently, the district court’s jury instruction 
was proper and the evidence sufficient . . . .”). 
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possession. The first subsection will provide general background on the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines. This will include their creation, 
their raison d’être, and their basic method for determining sentences. 
The final subsection will examine the specific impact these guidelines 
have on felon in possession law including an examination of sentence 
enhancements that are germane to most felon in possession offenses. 
A. General Background 
In the mid-1980s, Congress formed the United States Sentencing 
Commission (“the Commission”) in an effort to curb sentencing 
disparities and uncertainty.50 This Commission developed numerous 
guidelines and policies set out in the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (“the Guidelines” or “the USSG”).51 The 
Commission’s authority stemmed from the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984,52 part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.53 This act 
delegated broad powers to the Commission in its charge to “review and 
rationalize the federal sentencing process.”54 The Commission’s 
authority today is rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).55 The basic purpose of 
the guidelines was to further the four major principals of criminal 
justice: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.56 
The Commission’s most important duty was to create offense 
behavior categories and offender characteristic categories.57 The offense 
behavior categories look at the particulars of the crime, such as whether 
a weapon was used or how much money was taken.58 Categories of 
offender characteristics are concerned with the individual being 
sentenced, usually the number of past crimes the individual committed 
and the seriousness of those crimes.59 The Commission then created 
guideline ranges used to determine the “appropriate sentence for each 
 
50 See Mark T. Dooer, Note, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality of 
Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 238 (2009).  
51 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1-2 (2009). 
52 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987 (1984). 
53 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 201, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976 (1984). 
54 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
55 Id. § 1A3.1. 
56 Id. § 1A1.2. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
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class of convicted persons determined by coordinating the offense 
behavior categories with the offender characteristic categories.”60 
Congress’s goals in having the Commission create the Guidelines were 
threefold: (1) to achieve an honest and fair sentencing system without 
the need for parole boards; (2) to achieve reasonable sentence 
uniformity by making sure similar sentences were imposed upon 
similarly situated criminals committing similar offenses; and (3) to 
achieve proportionality in sentences based on the relative severity of the 
offense.61 The Commission acknowledges tension between ensuring 
uniformity and ensuring proportionality.62 
The Guidelines are based on the offenses charged by the 
government, but they also look to elements of the defendant’s real 
conduct during the crime for purposes of sentencing.63 For example, 
under the Guidelines, two identical former felons committing identical 
bank robberies with a firearm should be sentenced within the same 
guideline range as one another.64 This result should remain constant 
even if the government convicted one former felony under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g) felon in possession violation and the other under 18 U.S.C. § 
2113(a) bank robbery violation, because the guidelines look not only to 
the charge elements of the crime but also to the defendant’s real 
conduct.65 
The Commission initially determined the Guideline ranges by 
estimating “the average sentences served within each category under the 
pre-guidelines sentencing system[,]” taking into account the relative 
differences among those who served the sentences, and examining “the 
sentences specified in federal statutes, in the parole guidelines, and in 
other relevant, analogous sources.”66 There is evidence, however, that 
the Commission may have simply acquiesced to certain views of 
 
60 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
61 Id. § 1A1.3. 
62 Id. See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) (“The Guidelines 
commentary explains how, despite considerable disagreement within the criminal justice 
community, the Commission has gone about writing Guidelines that it intends to embody 
these ends. It says, for example, that the goals of uniformity and proportionality often 
conflict. The commentary describes the difficulties involved in developing a practical 
sentencing system that sensibly reconciles the two ends.”). 
63 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(a) (2009). 
64 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005). 
65 See id. 
66 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(g) (2009). 
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Congress in its determination of some of the guidelines.67 
Originally, the Guidelines required the district courts to sentence in 
accordance with the Guidelines unless the individual defendant’s 
situation required a departure from the guideline range.68 In the case of a 
departure, the departing court had to specify atypical characteristics of 
the defendant or some other reason for the departure.69 Regardless of 
whether the district court followed or departed from the guideline range, 
the United States Circuit Court for the circuit enveloping the district 
court had, as it still does, the power to review the sentence imposed 
below.70 
The Guidelines remained mandatory, with the exception of 
departures, until 2005.71 In United States v. Booker,72 the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines 
violated the Sixth Amendment in that as courts placed an increasing 
emphasis on facts used solely for the purpose of sentence 
enhancements, the role of the jury as fact-finder for the underlying 
crime became diminished.73 In order to save the Guidelines, which the 
Court implied would still have value in examining the defendant’s “real 
conduct”74 to minimize sentencing disparities for similarly situated 
defendants,75 the Court severed two sections of the statute.76 The first 
 
67 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007) (“The Commission did not 
use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking 
offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s weight-driven scheme.”). See also K. Anthony 
Thomas, Memorandum in Support of John Doe’s Position on Sentencing, 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/2K2.1%20Sentmemo.pdf (“In the wake of Rita, Gall, 
and Kimbrough, courts around the country are scrutinizing once-inscrutable guidelines, 
finding that a perhaps—surprising number of them are not the result of empirical research 
and national experience, and imposing sentences that accord with their evaluation of the § 
3553(a) factors overall.”). 
68 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
69 See id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003). 
70 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
71 § 1A2. 
72 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
73 See id. at 236-237.  The Court subsequently stated that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment 
question . . .  is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the 
judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede).” (emphasis in 
original). Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)). 
74 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252 (2005). 
75 Id. at 250-251. 
76 Id. at 259. 
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section severed was 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which had made 
sentencing within the Guidelines mandatory. The other section severed 
was 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), provided for de novo appellate review of 
departures from the Guidelines. The effect of these severances relegated 
the Guidelines to an advisory capacity.77 In United States v. Rita,78 the 
Court subsequently addressed the standard of review for a sentence 
imposed within the guideline range and adopted a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness.79 
In the courtroom, the sentencing judge usually begins by 
considering the presentence report80 and the interpretation it gives to the 
guidelines.81 The judge may then hear arguments from the prosecution 
or defense as to why the Guidelines sentence is inapplicable to the 
particular defendant.82 Under USSG § 5K2.0, either side may argue for a 
departure from the Guidelines’ range because the particular defendant 
falls outside the scope to which the Commission meant the Guidelines 
to apply.83 The sides may also argue that, based on Booker, the Court 
should vary the sentence because it would either not reflect the goals of 
sentencing contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or be improper for some 
other reason.84 The judge will then determine the sentence based on the 
calculated guideline range, any grounds for departures, and the 
sentencing objectives contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).85 
 
77 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2010) (“The Court reasoned 
that an advisory guideline system, while lacking the mandatory features that Congress 
enacted, retains other features that help to further congressional objectives, including 
providing certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted.” (referring to Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65)).  See 
also Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, 
must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” (citing 18 USC 
§ 3553 (a)(4), (5) (Supp. 2004))). 
78 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
79 Id. at 350-51. 
80 For the procedure mandated by statute upon the probation officer preparing the 
report, see 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1990). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (providing the criminal 
procedural rule for sentencing a criminal defendant in federal court and specifically 
outlining what must be included in the presentence report). 
81 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009). 
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Section 3553(a) gives the factors that the sentencing court must 
consider in its imposition of a sentence.86 The statute contains an initial 
limiting clause, providing that the sentence be sufficient but not greater 
than necessary to comply with the need for the sentence based on the 
sub-factors of subsection two (“the need for the sentence imposed”).87 
The first factor to be considered is “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”88 
The next factor is the need for the sentence imposed.89 The need for 
the sentence imposed ought to: (1) reflect the seriousness of the crime, 
promote respect for the law and provide just punishment; (2) provide 
adequate deterrence; (3) protect the public from any future crimes by 
the defendant; and (4) give the defendant any needed vocational or 
educational training.90 The court will then consider the kinds of 
sentences available, the sentence established by the guidelines range, 
pertinent policy statements, “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct[,]”and finally any need for restitution.91 While 
this analysis appears to consider the guidelines as only one distinct part 
of the sentencing process, some believe the overall process necessitates 
imposing the same sentence that would have been reached under the 
mandatory Guidelines, thus making the Guidelines more than 
“advisory” if not making them effectively mandatory.92 
B.  The Guidelines With Respect to Felon in Possession Law 
With respect to felon in possession law, the defendant’s prior 
convictions play a large part in driving up the guideline range.93 Some 
 
86 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010). 
87 § 3553(a). 
88 § 3553(a)(1). 
89 § 3553(a)(2). 
90 § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). 
91 § 3553(a)(3)-(7). 
92 See Hon. Michael W. McConnell, U.S.C.J., The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 
665, 682 (2006) (“In practical effect, the Guidelines continue to be the benchmark for 
responsible judging, with variances only for unusual cases. Moreover, and more 
speculatively, appellate review may coerce virtual Guidelines compliance in the ordinary 
run of cases.”) 
93 Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Sixth Annual American Judicature Society 
Symposium Assessing the Values of Punishment: The State of Sentencing in the United 
States Criminal Justice System: Symposium Article: Improving the Guidelines through 
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prior convictions are treated more severely than others; “[s]pecifically, 
prior convictions for crimes of violence or drug-trafficking offenses 
result in an enhanced offense level.”94 Not only will previous crimes 
quickly raise the guideline range, but the Commission has also 
increased the rate at which those convictions will raise the guideline 
range.95 
Due to concern that a large portion of the sentences for felony 
possession of a firearm were at the high end of the guideline range, the 
Sentencing Commission used one of its working groups to examine 
possible amendments.96 The group concluded “that characteristics such 
as actual or intended use of the weapon, drug-related conduct, or 
possession of particularly deadly weapons accounted for such 
sentences.”97 Despite the group finding “that there was no strong 
correlation between the existence of the types of prior convictions listed 
(firearm offenses, drug-related offenses, or convictions for crimes of 
violence) and the length of sentence imposed,” the Commission still 
raised the base offense level by twelve points for defendants previously 
convicted of two felony convictions for either violent crimes or crimes 
involving controlled dangerous substances.98 
The Commission revised the guidelines in response to Congress’s 
enactment of the Armed Career Criminal Act.99 The Commission 
reasoned that, in passing the Armed Career Criminal Act, Congress 
 
Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role for District, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 587 (2009) 
(“For status offenses such as felon in possession of a firearm and unlawful reentry after 
deportation, the guideline range is largely driven by the nature of the defendant’s prior 
convictions.”). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 587-88 
96 Thomas, supra note 67, at 10. See also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93. 
97 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 10-
11. 
98 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587-88. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 
10-11. See generally, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 67 
(2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/ 
Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study_full.pdf. (Perhaps most startling is the 
treatment of gun traffickers compared to those whose only crime is possession of a firearm: 
“For traffickers, the use of probation has been steadily reduced to about one-quarter of its 
preguidelines level, replaced by imprisonment and, to a lesser extent, intermediate 
sanctions. For illegal possessors, probation has been replaced almost completely by 
imprisonment.”) 
99 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 10-
11. 
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“had determined that greater sentences were called for when the 
defendant had prior convictions for drugs or violence.”100 This was done 
despite the Commission’s own research to the contrary.101 Today, the 
average prison sentence has doubled from what it was in the pre-
Guidelines era.102 
There are numerous provisions of the Guidelines that call for 
additional sentence enhancements or even upward departures for the use 
or possession of a gun.103 Section 5K2.6 of the Guidelines calls for an 
increased sentence above the guideline range if the defendant used or 
possessed a weapon or dangerous instrumentality during the 
commission of the offense, 104 presuming the sentencing judge finds the 
guideline range does not adequately take into account the degree of 
danger presented by the firearm.105 At least one court has held that this 
departure could be used after the application of several sentencing 
enhancements pursuant to Section 2K2.1106 of the Guidelines.107 
Section 2K2.1 contains many enhancements that may apply to 
felons in possession of firearms. First, this section provides for 
calculation of the base offense level to be used in the guideline 
 
100 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 10-
11. 
101 See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587-88. See also Thomas, supra note 67, 
at 11. 
102 Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588. 
103 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2009); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2009). 
104 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2009) (“If a weapon or dangerous 
instrumentality was used or possessed in the commission of the offense the court may 
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase 
ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the weapon, the manner in which it was 
used, and the extent to which its use endangered others. The discharge of a firearm might 
warrant a substantial sentence increase.”). 
105 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(2)-(3) (2009). The advisory note 
provides an example of a robbery that results in an injury to another. While injury to another 
is generally taken into account by the guidelines as part of a robbery with a specific 
enhancement depending on the extent, an upward departure may be warranted if the robber 
injured multiple people.  Id. 
106 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2009). 
107 United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1248-50 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that an 
upward departure for a felon in possession may be warranted based on the quantity of 
firearms and the inherent danger of those particular types of firearms despite the application 
of similar sentence enhancements under Section 2K2.1). 
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calculation.108 For a felon in possession, the minimum base offense level 
is fourteen and the maximum is twenty-six.109 If the offense involves a 
weapon identified in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)110 or a semi-automatic firearm 
with a large capacity magazine the base offense level is twenty.111 
Similarly, if the defendant’s former felony is for a crime of violence or 
a controlled dangerous substance (i.e., drug) offense, the base offense 
level is also twenty.112 If both of the aforementioned are true, that the 
crime involved one of the specified weapons, and the defendant was 
formerly found guilty of a violent or drug offense, the base level 
becomes twenty-two.113 Two convictions for either violent or controlled 
substance offenses leads to a base offense level of twenty-four,114 and 
when combined with one of the specifically identified weapons, 
increases the base offense level to twenty-six.115 
The next part of Section 2K2.1 deals with enhancements to the 
base offense levels.116 If more than three weapons are possessed, the 
base offense level will increase depending on the precise number.117 If 
the defendant possessed a destructive device, the base offense level will 
increase fifteen points for a rocket or missile, or two points for any 
other kind of destructive device.118 A stolen firearm will increase the 
base offense level by two points,119 and any destruction or alteration of 
the serial number on the firearm will increase the base offense level by 
four points.120 While Section 2K2.1 limits the increases to a maximum 
offense level of twenty-nine121 under these particular enhancements,122 
 
108 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a) (2009). 
109 Id. § 2K2.1(a). 
110 This essentially applies to modified (“sawed-off”) shotguns, modified rifles, 
machineguns, and any firearm with a silencer. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1986). 
111 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (2009). 
112 Id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). 
113 Id. § 2K2.1(a)(3). 
114 Id. § 2K2.1(a)(2). 
115 Id. § 2K2.1(a)(1). 
116 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b) (2009) (“Specific Offense 
Characteristics”). 
117 See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(1) (2009). 
118 See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(3) (2009). 
119 See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (2009). 
120 See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) (2009). 
121 Unless the fifteen-point increase applies from Section 2K2.1(b)(3), in this case, the 
offense level may rise above twenty-nine points. Id. § 2K2.1(b) (2009). 
122 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b) (2009) (“The cumulative offense 
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other enhancements may apply to raise the offense level well-above 
twenty-nine.123 Involvement in firearm trafficking raises the level by 
four,124 as does possession in connection with another felony.125 
There are also provisions that may apply to the felon in possession 
due to his previous felonious conduct. The first and most noticeable 
effect is on the defendant’s criminal history category, which will 
necessarily be higher than a criminal history category of I (one). The 
defendant may also be given an upward departure on the basis of any 
previous conduct of which he was acquitted.126 
III. FEDERALIZATION OF STREET CRIME 
In 2001, the federal government began a program known as 
“Project Safe Neighborhood” to enforce “the strict provisions of federal 
law, including no right to bail, long sentences with minimal good-time, 
and incarceration in the federal prison system.”127 The idea of 
“federalizing” traditionally state jurisdiction crimes is neither new nor 
unique to the felon in possession law.128 The source of federal 
government authority in local crimes is based on the expansive, post-
New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause.129 In the case of the 
felon in possession law, there is a Constitutional requirement  that the 
weapon travelled from one state to another, a de minimis standard.130   
One consequence of the increased prosecution of traditionally state 
crimes is that the federal prison population has increased at a faster rate 
 
level determined from the application of subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) may not exceed 
level 29, except if subsection (b)(3)(A) applies.”). 
123 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(5)-(7) (2009).  See also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(c) (2009). 
124 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2009). 
125 Id. § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2009). 
126 Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E) (2009).  See also United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1250-51 
(1st Cir. 1996) (“U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e) . . . plainly encompasses charged conduct underlying 
vacated convictions.”); United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
district courts are . . . free . . . to decide whether the conduct underlying the vacated 
conviction warrants an upward departure pursuant to Section 4A1.3 because it provides 
‘reliable information’ regarding the defendant’s criminal past.”). 
127 MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 178. 
128 Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal 
Law: The Need for Meaningful Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1311 (1997). 
129 Id. 
130 See discussion supra Section I. 
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than the state prison population.131 In the past fifteen years, the federal 
prison population has doubled.132  Specifically pertaining to felons in 
possession, the number of unlawful weapons defendants appearing in 
court almost doubled from 2000 to 2005.133 Not only is the number of 
defendants increasing, but the mean length of imposed sentences is also 
trending upwards.134 
One potent example of the interaction among the felon in 
possession law, sentencing under the guidelines, and increasing 
federalization of state crime can be seen in Colorado’s “Project Exile.”135 
This was a pilot program for the national “Project Safe Neighborhood,” 
but specifically mandated the zealous federal prosecution of weapons 
offenses.136 The program provided for three new Assistant United States 
Attorneys who would exclusively handle Project Exile cases.137 This 
campaign resulted in the prosecution of 191 people in Colorado, but 154 
of those 191 people had committed no previous violent felony.138 Of the 
remaining people, only seventeen had even possessed a firearm in their 
previous crimes and only four actually discharged the weapon.139 James 
Allison, speaking for Colorado’s United States Attorney’s Office, takes 
the position that the felon in possession law is not only concerned with 
violence, but also is concerned with limiting access to firearms for those 
who have evinced bad judgment by way of past felonious conduct.140 
This bad judgment, the office argues, makes these people relatively 
more dangerous to society.141 Mr. Allison purports that this view echoes 
Congress’ concerns in enacting the felon in possession statute.142 This 
 
131 Prison Count 2010: State Population Declines for the First Time in 38 Years, PEW 
CTR. OF THE STATES, 1 (2010), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org 
/report_detail.aspx?id=57653. 
132 Id. 
133 See infra Appendix I “Number of defendants in cases filed.” 
134 See infra Appendix II “Mean prison sentence in months.” 
135 David Holthouse, Living in Exile: Federal Prisons Are Filling up with People Whose 







141 Holthouse, supra note 135. 
142 Id. (“‘And from my (James Allison’s) observation, people who have felony 
convictions, whether they’re forgery, writing bad checks, stealing or doing anything else 
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view, however, ignores any predetermination of the relative 
dangerousness of the individual based on their previous sentence. 
The fact that felon in possession charges can be predicated upon 
past state level convictions adds a level of complexity to the analysis of 
the “dangerousness” of the felon in possession. The law states that any 
person convicted of a felony punishable by up to a year imprisonment, 
or a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years imprisonment, cannot 
possess a firearm.143 This requirement may be overbroad in that it will 
“indiscriminately sweep up state convictions regardless of their 
manifestations of dangerousness.”144 Additionally, notice may be 
wanting because the law states that, to serve as a predicate, the felony 
may have been punishable by up to a year in prison.145 The law may 
leave individuals who obtained more lenient sentencing, especially 
those who were not sentenced to any term of imprisonment, unaware 
that they are subject to the law.146 
Allowing federal convictions based on prior state convictions is 
also a problem because it ignores the lenity granted by the state court 
judge when determining whether or not someone is a felon for purposes 
of the statute.147 One can reasonably infer that, in certain cases where the 
state court judge is lenient, the judge may have believed that the 
individual was not particularly dangerous to society. However, the state 
court’s prior determination of the relative dangerousness of the 
individual is disregarded for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
IV. CRIMINAL FORUM SHOPPING 
Due to the concurrent jurisdiction between the state and the federal 
government for these types of weapons violations, when a firearm 
 
that’s nonviolent, they have bad judgment. And I agree with Congress that if you’re going to 
limit the possession of firearms, let’s start with people who’ve been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have exercised very poor judgment.’”). 
143 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005). See also Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in 
Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 80-82 
(2006). 
144 Logan, supra note 143, at 80. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. For a brief analysis of the Second Amendment concerns this situation presents, 
see Douglas A. Berman, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/08/seventh-circuit-rejects-
asapplied-second-amendment-challenge-to-922g1-but-suggests-a-nonviolent-felo.html. 
147 Logan, supra note 143, at 81-82. 
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possessed by a former felon has traveled interstate, local law 
enforcement is able to refer the case for federal prosecution.148 However, 
local prosecutors, because of the duplicitous nature of the federal 
criminal code, would have pursued many of these cases anyway.149 
Additionally, in at least one jurisdiction in the Eastern District of 
Michigan, under Project Safe Neighborhood, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
will consult with local law enforcement and if the defendant meets a 
certain criteria the local prosecutor’s office will offer the defendant a 
plea bargain at the state level with the consequence of federal 
prosecution for refusal.150  This threat of federal prosecution allows the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office to secure harsher plea bargains at the state level, 
thus accomplishing Congress’s goals in securing harsher penalties under 
Section 922(g) without having to expend substantial federal resources.151  
While Congress purposely wrote the statute to be over-inclusive, with 
the understanding that U.S. Attorney’s Office would exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, it seems unlikely that Congress contemplated 
this use.152 Allowing law enforcement officers to determine whether to 
refer a case for federal prosecution reduces political accountability at 
the state level by allowing the state legislature to not incur the political 
cost of maintaining its own felon in possession statute.153 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Certain legal scholars have been critical of the federalization of 
street crime with respect to disparate sentencing at the state and federal 
levels.154 In a state court, the defendant may receive a sentence that is 
 
148 See Edward R. McGuire & William R. King, Trends in the Policing Industry, 593 
ANNALS 15, 28 (2004). 
149 Daniel Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law 
Enforcement, 2 BOUNDARY CHANGES CRIM. JUST. ORG. 81, 98 (Charles M. Friel, ed., 2000), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf. 
150 Melodee Henderson, Case Digest Issue: Constitutional Law - Due Process - Federal 
Prosecution Following a Defendant’s Rejection of a State Plea Offer Does Not Violate Due 
Process or Constitute Vindictive Prosecution, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
151 Id.  See also United States v. Gray, 382 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
(holding that this type of practice does not constitute “vindictive prosecution” and denying 
dismissal of the indictment). 
152 See generally James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting 
Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (1991). 
153 Richman, supra note 149, at 97. 
154 Id. 
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relatively mild when compared to a federal sentence for the same 
conduct.155 The federal government’s reliance on prior state offenses to 
establish criminal liability for a crime over which the state has 
concurrent jurisdiction is particularly disconcerting.156 By imposing 
harsher sentences, the federal government substitutes its own judgment 
in penalizing local criminal conduct for the judgment of the state.157 
Aberrational state-federal sentencing disparities based on the 
federalization of street-crime decreases political accountability.158 By 
deciding to refer a case for federal prosecution, state law enforcement is 
essentially circumventing the law of the state in which the arrest 
occurred.159 If the people of that state would have adopted the federal 
law with the accompanying guideline range, then the state legislature is 
able to escape the political costs of their enactments.160 However, if the 
people of the state would not have adopted the legislation, then state law 
enforcement is essentially nullifying the preferences of the electorate.161 
In either scenario, securing harsher penalties under federal law obscures 
state-level accountability.162 Furthermore, virtually every circuit has held 
that the district court need not consider the hypothetical state sentence 
for the crime, and that has exacerbated this obfuscation.163 
However, the courts do differ in the extent to which they exclude 
consideration of sentences for similarly situated state defendants. Even 
post-Booker, some circuits take a “hard” approach by declaring 
irrelevant the potential state sentence a federal defendant would have 
faced.164 Other circuits take a “soft” approach by declaring that it is not 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 104. 
157 Logan, supra note 143, at 95-96. 
158 Richman, supra note 149, at 97. 
159 Id. at 97, 102. 
160 Id. at 97. 
161 Id. 
162 See generally id. 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Ringgold, 571 F.3d 948, 950-53 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We 
agree with those circuits to have reached the issue that a district court judge does not abuse 
his discretion in declining to consider under § 3553(a)(6) the sentence a defendant would 
have received for the same conduct in state court.”). 
164 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 686 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
improper a district court sentence that, in light of the fact that the case was first brought in 
state court before being prosecuted federally, considered the corresponding state sentence); 
United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 2007) (“holding that it is 
impermissible for a district court to consider the defendant’s likely state court sentence as a 
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error for a district court to refuse to consider the potential state sentence 
a federal defendant would have faced.165 The reason for the circuit 
courts’ universal refusal to consider the state-federal sentencing 
disparity, as mentioned above, is that Congress directed the Guidelines 
be created to provide federal sentencing uniformity.166 This is among the 
Guidelines’ purported goals.167 
However, the technical and practical applications of the felon in 
possession law undermine this concern for federal sentencing 
uniformity. The felon in possession law is already closely tied to state 
substantive law and state law enforcement. As mentioned previously, 
felon in possession cases are often predicated on state offenses. They 
also often originate at the state level either with state law enforcement 
or, in some instances, in state court. These two aspects of the felon in 
possession law, along with their respective problems as referenced 
throughout this paper, destroy any chance of uniformity in the federal 
system in the first instance, and then carry those disparities forward to 
sentencing. For this reason, it seems naïve to urge uniformity in federal 
sentencing when the underlying convictions will, by statutory 
definition, be dependent upon disparate state law. 
A preferable sentencing method would be to allow, if not require in 
some cases, the district courts to consider the state-federal sentencing 
disparity. The increase of felon in possession convictions due to the 
increased efforts of federal prosecutors through programs such as 
Project Safe Neighborhood, a program that demonstrably aimed its pilot 
 
factor in determining his federal sentence”); United States v. Schmitt, 495 F.3d 860, 863 
(7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that it is impermissible to consider federal-state sentencing 
disparities when it would increase sentencing disparities among federal defendants); United 
States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The District Court was neither 
required nor permitted under § 3553(a)(6) to consider a potential federal/state sentencing 
disparity in imposing Jeremiah’s sentence.”). 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
the district court’s refusal to consider the federal-state sentencing disparity where a felon in 
possession defendant faced 120 months in federal court, but would only have faced up to 
seven years (eighty-four months) in state court); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 
1112 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing “hard approach” cases but limiting decision to declaring 
reasonable a refusal to consider federal-state sentencing disparities); United States v. 
Dowdy, 216 Fed. App’x. 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding it is not error to decline to 
consider disparate sentences between coconspirators when one is prosecuted in state court 
and the other in federal court). 
166 Dowdy, 216 Fed. App’x. at 182. 
167 Id. See also discussion supra Section II.A. 
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at people without any history of violence, creates fairness concerns. 
This is especially true when the federal government uses threat of 
federal indictment to affect harsher state-level plea bargains. Allowing 
the courts to consider the federal-state sentencing disparity would help 
to allay some of these problems and reign in an overly harsh system. 
Additionally, allowing federal courts to consider state sentences 
could ease the tension between uniformity and proportionality in the 
Guidelines. If predicating criminal liability on state crimes lessens 
federal uniformity in the first instance, removing the concern altogether 
should provide for more proportionate sentences and thus achieve 
another of the Guidelines’ goals. Tracking federal sentences to state 
sentences in this context could allow for greater recognition of the 
relative dangerousness of the defendant in that particular community 
because the state is less removed from the citizenry of that state than is 
the federal government. This would also force politicians to make real 
decisions on felon in possession penalties if they agree with the federal 
government that the penalties should be harsh. In other words, it would 
eliminate the negative effect on political accountability at the state level. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In an era when prison overcrowding is a growing concern due to 
real economic limitations, it may be an unwise policy to use federal 
resources in pursuing essentially local crime. Tracking federal sentences 
for felon in possession offenses could help to stem the growth of the 
federal prison system. By removing one of the prosecutorial benefits of 
federal court, i.e., harsher sentences, federal prosecutors would likely 
pursue only the more serious offenses; the cost of prosecuting the lesser 
offenses may now outweigh the relative benefits. If state prosecutors do 
bring charges on the felon in possession offenses previously handled by 
the federal government, the impact on the prison system should be 
relatively less because there are significantly more state prisons on the 
aggregate than there are federal prisons. The relative increase in the 
prison population of the state should be less than the relative increase in 
the prison population of the federal government. This would focus 
prison and prosecutorial resources on the most dangers offenders by 
taking away incentives to incarcerate people who may simply have 
evinced bad judgment in the past, but who are nonetheless not 
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169 See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under “U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Mean 
prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for defendants convicted”; then select year and 
choose “Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”; 
then select “18 922 G”; finally, select desired output format) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010), 
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170 See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under “U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” 
select “Mean prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for defendants 
convicted”; then select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within 
U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally, 
select desired output format) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010), data is on file with author 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Defendants sentenced to life
